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DOE V. PORITZ: A CONSTITUTIONAL YIELD
TO AN ANGRY SOCIETYT
INTRODUCTION
On July 29, 1994, in Hamilton Township, New Jersey, a seven-year-old
girl named Megan Kanka was lured into a neighbor's house by a man who
offered to show her his new dog.' Megan's neighbor pulled her into his
bedroom, strangled her with a belt and then sexually assaulted her.2 The
neighbor was Jesse Timmendequas, a twice-convicted sex offender who had
served six years in prison for a previous attempted assault on a child
Publicity about the crime provoked public outrage stemming from the
fact that someone with a background of sex crimes had lived in the
community anonymously.4 The New Jersey Legislature responded to the
outcry by approving a controversial state statute requiring every convicted sex
offender to register with the police after release from prison.5 Known as
Megan's Law, the statute also mandates community notification regarding the
whereabouts of certain convicted sex offenders, depending upon the
seriousness of their offense and the likelihood of recidivism.6
t Due to the controversial nature of Megan's Law, its constitutionality is continually being
debated in both the judicial and legislative branches of government. As such, at the time this
Note is published, various topics discussed herein may have changed. The information contained
in this Note is current as of March 1996.
1. Ana Puga, Justice Dept., ACLU Clash on NJ. Bid to Register Sex Offenders, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 26, 1995, at 17.
2. Id.
3. Fergus Kelly, Do Sex Offenders Have a Right to Privacy?, THE TIMES (London), Dec.
17, 1995, at 3. Jesse Timmendequas is expected to stand trial for the kidnap, sexual assault, and
felony-murder of Megan Kanka, beginning February 19, 1996. Brendan Schurr, House Where
Girl Was Slain Is Razed For Park SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 25, 1994, at A3. See also Sex-Crime
Defendant Seeks Alias For Victim, CH. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1995, at 10 (discussing Timmendequas's
request that Megan Kanka be identified by alias in front of the jury, due to widespread
publication of "Megan's Law").
4. Robert L. Jackson, Sex Offender Notification Laws Facing Legal Hurdles, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1995, at A5. Jesse Timendequas had lived across the street from Megan Kanka with
two other convicted sex offenders. Anna Quindlen, Megan's Law, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1994,
at A19.
5. Jackson, supra note 4, at A5. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-5 (,Vest
1995). The bill was enacted into law just three months after Megan's slaying. Commentators
say Megan's Law was the product of "politics and passion." Michelle Ruess, Second Thoughts
About Megan's Law Concern Growing Over Ripple Effects, Rec. N. N.J., Feb. 19, 1996, at Al.
Apparently, lawmakers ignored witnesses who raised questions regarding the law. Id. Assembly
members did not hold committee meetings-passing Megan's Law was declared a legislative
emergency. Id.
6. Jackson, supra note 4, at A5. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 (West 1995). Megan's Law
sets forth a three-tiered scheme by which the sex offender's risk of reoffense is ranked. Different
levels of community notification are provided based upon the sex offender's rating. See
discussion infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. A recidivist is defined as a habitual
criminal. BLACK'S LAWv DICrIoNARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990).
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Two months after the enactment of Megan's Law, a New Jersey man,
using the pseudonym John Doe, challenged the constitutionality of the statute
based upon its retroactive application.7 Doe claimed the sex offender
registration and notification statutes violate several constitutional provisions,
including protection from ex post facto laws,8 bills of attainder,9 double
jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, and privacy infringement.'0 In a
6-1 decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the registration and
community notification laws did not violate any of the constitutional clauses
that Doe cited." The court did, however, require that a process of judicial
review be added to the statute's guidelines, so as to promote judicial fairness
and due process for offenders subject to public notification.' With this
addition, the court held the legislation would be valid and effective immedi-
ately upon all convicted sex offenders.' 3
This Note will analyze the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Doe
v. Poritz, focusing particularly on its impact to sex offenders convicted before
the law's enactment. Part I will discuss the facts of Poritz, the procedural
history and the appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Part II will
discuss the New Jersey sex offender registration and notification laws and
how the decision in Poritz modified the statutes to include a process of
judicial review. Part III will focus on the ex post facto clause of the United
States Constitution and the meaning of "punishment" within the clause when
7. Doe v. Poritz, 661 A.2d 1335 (N.J. Super. 1995), aff'd, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
8. An ex post facto law is defined as "[a] law passed after the occurrence of a fact or
commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such
fact or deed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 580 (6th. ed. 1990). The United States Constitution
and New Jersey Constitution bar enactment of ex post facto legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, cl. 3. In addition, forty-six of the fifty state constitutions
also ban ex post facto laws. Only Delaware, Hawaii, New York, and Vermont have no such
provision. Stated broadly, the constitutional clauses prohibit any law which, in relation to the
past offense or its punitive consequences, alters the situation of the offender to his disadvantage.
See discussion infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
9. A bill of attainder is defined as "a legislative act, regardless of form, that applies to either
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (6th. ed. 1990).
The Poritz court held Megan's Law did not violate the prohibition against bills of attainder
because such prohibition applies only to punitive legislation, not to regulations. See Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 406 (N.J. 1995) (holding that Megan's Law is a regulatory measure and
not punishment for past crime). Likewise, because the court found that Megan's Law is not
punitive, it similarly disposed of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the
challenge to Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
10. The court held that Megan's Law does not violate a protection of Doe's privacy because
the public is already permitted to review prior arrest and conviction records. Poritz, 662 A.2d
at 407. The court found that disclosure of the offender's age and legal residence or a description
of his vehicle would not infringe on an expectation of privacy because the records of the
Department of Motor Vehicles are also public records. Id. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN § 47:
1A-2 (1989). The court further found the offender did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in matters already exposed to public view, such as physical appearance. Poritz, 662 A.2d
at 407 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
11. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367.
12. Id. at 420-21. See discussion infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
13. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 422.
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applied to sex offenders convicted prior to the law's enactment. Part IV will
analyze why the case was not correctly decided and how the United States
Supreme Court should rule on the matter. Based on prior holdings, this Note
will anticipate whether the Court will affirm Poritz or reverse it as a violation
of the United States Constitution. Finally, this Note will conclude with a
discussion of whether sex offender notification laws are punitive in nature and
effect, and thus, violate the ex post facto clause of Article 1, Section 10 of
the United States Constitution and article 4, section 7 of the New Jersey State
Constitution. 4
I. FACTS OF DOE v. PORITZ
The plaintiff John Doe was indicted and charged in June of 1985 with
sexual assault for molesting two teenage boys." Doe entered into a plea
agreement for a term of imprisonment not to exceed 15 years. 6  In
September of 1985, Doe was examined by a psychologist at the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey (hereinafter
ADTC).' 7 Center staff determined that Doe's conduct was characterized by
a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior. 8 In February 1986, Doe
was sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment at ADTC with a three-year
period of parole ineligibility.' 9 After Doe allegedly participated in all
aspects of the treatment program offered to him at ADTC, his primary
therapist recommended he be considered for parole.2" After interviewing
Doe in the fall of 1991, the review board concluded Doe "was 'capable of
making an acceptable social adjustment' and, therefore, rec6mmended Doe's
release on supervised parole.2'
Doe contended that he had complied with all the provisions of his parole
release, including participation in aftercare psychological treatment.22 He
now rents an apartment and is employed.23 Although Doe admits that his
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, Cl. 1 provides: "No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder
[or] ex post facto Law . . . ." Similarly, N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, cl. 3 provides: "The
Legislature shall not pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation
of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the
contract was made." For purposes of this Note, both the United States Constitution and New
Jersey Constitution will be referred by the author as "Constitution".
15. Doe v. Poritz, 661 A.2d. 1335, 1337 (N.J. Super. 1995), affd, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J.
1995).






22. Id. Doe's sentence and parole requirements terminated in June of 1992.
23. Id Doe has a master's degree and works in a New Jersey consulting firm as a research
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employer and fellow employees are aware of his past, he claims community
notification under Megan's Law will jeopardize his job, family, participation
in civic organizations and his membership in a New Jersey health club. 4
In early 1995, Doe brought suit in New Jersey Superior Court against
Deborah Poritz, the Attorney General of the state of New Jersey, seeking to
enjoin application of both the registration and notification laws. Doe
challenged the statutes as a violation of his right to privacy, due process and
equal protection. Doe further contended the laws were ex post facto in
nature, and were cruel and unusual punishment.25 The Superior Court
upheld the statute's constitutionality and Doe appealed. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted review.26
Acting within five months, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the
lower courts ruling. The court held Megan's Law was constitutional but
required the Attorney General of New Jersey to implement a process of
judicial review before public notification would be given effect. 27 The court
held thereafter, the Attorney General's guidelines for notification would be
valid and effective immediately.28
In October 1995, Doe appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
however, the justices declined to hear his case.29 Commentators believe the
Court rejected his case due to the pending appeal of Artway v. Attorney
General of New Jersey,3" a similar case involving a sex-offender who was
convicted before Megan's Law was enacted.3 In Artway, the United States
District Court in New Jersey held the notification provision of Megan's Law
was unconstitutional when applied retroactively to sex-offenders. 2 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals is expected to hear the Artway challenge and
make a ruling which will bind all cases in the state of New Jersey.33 If
either Poritz and/or Artway is appealed, and the Third Circuit rules differently
24. Maureen Castellano, Judge Calls Megan's Vulnerable; N.J. to Appeal, N.J.L.J., Jan. 9,
1995, at 5. This is all despite the fact that Doe's former doctors at ADTC have deemed him no
longer a threat to society.
25. Doe v. Poritz, 661 A.2d 1335, 1339 (N.J. Super. 1995).
26. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
27. Id. Prior to the court's holding in Poritz, the public notification process could take place
at any time, without notice or an opportunity to be heard by the registrant. Poritz changed that,
creating a hearing process to satisfy due process concerns. Since Poritz, the prosecutor must
promptly notify the registrant of the tier classification decision as well as his or her right to a
hearing in order to contest the decision. See discussion infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
28. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 423. See discussion of Attorney General's guidelines infra notes 65-
70 and accompanying text.
29. Rocco Cammarere, War: victims v. defendants; Megan's Law ruling nears in 3rd
Circuit, N.J. LAw, Jan. 29, 1996, at 1.
30. 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995) (appeal pending, Nos. 95-5157, 95-5194,95-5195 (3d
Cir.).
31. Michelle Ruess, Megan's Law Goes to Court, REC., Oct. 25, 1995, at Al. See
discussion of Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, infra notes 126-135 and accompanying
text.
32. See generally Artway v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995).
33. Cammarere, supra note 29, at 1.
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than the New Jersey Supreme Court did in Poritz, it is likely that the United
States Supreme Court will then hear both cases together and make an ultimate
ruling on the constitutionality of Megan's Law. Such a ruling would bind all
states nationwide.34
II. SEX-OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS
A. Federal Legislation: The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act
In 1994 Congress enacted legislation requiring states, as a condition of
federal funding for drug control,35 to enact registration and notification laws
covering convicted sex offenders. 36  The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, like Megan's Law, requires most sex offenders to verify
their addresses annually, and more dangerous sex offenders to do so every
ninety days.37 Under the Federal Act, those convicted of a criminal offense
34. Ruess, supra note 31, at Al.
35. Funding under this section is used to assist states in carrying out programs which
improve the criminal justice system, with special emphasis on a nationwide drug control strategy.
States which do not comply will lose 10% of their money which would otherwise be allocated
to them under 42 U.S.C. § 3756 (1995). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3756 (1995). Small states
could lose about $200,000 for noncompliance with the federal bill, larger states could lose
approximately $2 million. See Sex-Offender Laws Pushed by Reno, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 1995,
at A4.
36. The federal statute was enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). This
provision, called the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, is part of the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill. The bill is named after an 11-year-old
boy who was abducted in 1988. See Jackson, supra note 4. The Act authorizes the Attorney
General to establish guidelines for state programs. The specific language of the bill is codified
in 42 U.S.C. § 14071, and requires "a person who is convicted of a criminal offense against a
victim who is a minor or who is convicted of a sexually violent offense" or a person who is a
"sexually violent predator" to register a current address with a designated state lav enforcement
agency. Jacob Wetterling Act §§ 170101(a)(1)(A) & (B), 108 Stat. at 2038, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1407(a)(1) (1995). The requirement continues until 10 years have passed since the
offender was released from prison, placed on parole, supervised release, or probation, and the
person who knowingly fails to register is subject to criminal penalty. §§ 170101(b)(6)(A) & (C),
108 Stat. at 2041, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(c) (1995). Many states have enacted sex-
offender registration statutes, see ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.020, 18.65.087, 28.05.048, 33.30.035
(1995); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-12-901 - 12-12-909 (1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1988
& Supp. 1996); IDAHO PENAL CODE § 18-8301 - 18-8311 (1994); ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 730
(1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-1 -5-2-12-13 (Bums 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4901 - 22-
4910 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500 - 17.540, 17.990 (Michie 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11001-11004 (1995); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 4.475(1) - 4.475(12) (1994)
(effective Oct. 1, 1995); MIss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-17 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. Ann. § 207.152
(Michie 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-1 - 29-11A-8 (1995); N.Y. CORRECr. LAW §§ 168-
a-v (Consol. 1995) (effective Jan. 21, 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57 §§ 581-587 (1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs § 22-22-38 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE§ 9A.44.130 (1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 - 61-8F-8 (1995); Wis. STAT. § 175.45 (1994);
WYO. STAT. §§ 7-19-301 - 7-19-306 (1995).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(3) (1995). See discussion of New Jersey's verification
requirements infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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against a minor or those convicted of a second violent offense must comply
with the registration requirements for ten years."
For sexually violent predators, the registration requirement terminates
upon a determination that the offender no longer suffers from the personality
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory sexually violent
offense. 9 Offenders who fail to register or who fail to keep such registra-
tion current are subject to criminal sanctions of the state where registration
is required.4" Unlike Megan's Law, the federal provision does not require
public notification. The Act only requires notification to state and local law
enforcement and does not apply the registration requirements retroactively.41
B. New Jersey's Megan's Law
1. Registration Statute
New Jersey's law is aimed primarily at protecting minors and other
potential victims of sexually violent offenses.42 The law requires convicted
sex offenders to appear at local police stations for fingerprinting and
photographing.43 Registrants must also complete a registration form that
includes a physical description, the offense involved, home address,
employment or school address, vehicle used, license plate number, and any
other information the Attorney General deems necessary to assess future risk
of crime.44
For offenders in custody, registration is carried out in prison. The
requirements apply to all convicts, all juveniles found delinquent because of
38. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(A). The statute's legislative history does not provide any
justification for choosing this length of time. See generally H.R. REP. No. 392, 103d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1993).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(c). See discussion of New Jersey's penalty for failure to register
infra note 52 and accompanying text.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d). The federal Act allows for public notification, however, it does
not mandate it. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)(3). Of the forty states that have adopted sex offender
registration laws, (including New Jersey), five states do not apply their laws retroactively:
Arkansas; Colorado, Florida, Illinois, and Kansas. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 428 (N.J. 1995).
42. The registration law that New Jersey adopted pursuant to the federal act is located in
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 7-4. Those required to register are sex offenders who have been
convicted of crimes such as: aggravated sexual assault; sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual
contact; kidnapping; endangering the welfare of a child; luring or enticing; criminal sexual
contact if the victim is a minor and kidnapping; criminal restraint; or false imprisonment if the
victim is a minor and the offender not the parent; and in all cases an attempt to commit any of
the above. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(b)(1) and (2).
43. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-4(b).
44. Id. Other information that may be relevant in assessing risk of reoffense might include
criminal and correction records; nonprivileged personnel, treatment and abuse records; and
evidentiary genetic markers. Id.
45. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(c).
[Vol. 32
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the commission of sex offenses, and all persons found not guilty by reason
of insanity. 6  The requirements also apply to sex offenders convicted
elsewhere who relocate to New Jersey.47
Registrants whose conduct is repetitive and compulsive must verify their
addresses with their local law enforcement agency quarterly; other registrants
must do so annually. Upon relocation to another municipality, re-registra-
tion is required, and any change of address requires notice to local law
enforcement agencies.49
Registration is a lifetime requirement. Fifteen years after conviction or
release from a correctional facility, an offender can apply to terminate
registration by presenting evidence to a court that the offender is not likely
to pose a threat to the safety of others. " Registration records are open to
any law enforcement agency in any state and any federal law enforcement
agency.5  Failure to comply with the registration law is a fourth-degree
crime.52
2. Notification Statute
Part of the New Jersey registration statute requires local law enforcement
to notify communities of certain sex offenders in the neighborhood. 3 This
community notification law provides for three levels of notification, from
limited to extensive, depending on the degree of the risk of reoffense 4 All
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(a).
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(c)(3).
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(e).
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (c)(2)(3); Ruess, supra note 5, at Al.
50. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(f).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-5(a).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(a). Persons convicted of a fourth degree crime are subject
to eighteen months in jail. Furlong, supra note 23, at 12.
53. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-6 to 7-11. The following states provide, in their registration
statutes, some form of community notification: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. New Jersey's statute is unique in
that it is the only one in which community notification is mandatory for those in the highest risk
category rather than up to the discretion of local officials.
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) provides:
(1) If the risk of reoffense is low, law enforcement agencies likely to encounter
the person registered shall be notified;
(2) If risk of reoffense is moderate, organizations in the community including
schools, religious, and youth organizations shall be notified in accordance with the
Attorney General's guidelines, in addition to the notice required by paragraph (1) of
this subsection;
(3) If risk of reoffense is high, the public shall be notified through means in
accordance with the Attorney General's guidelines, designed to reach members of the
public likely to encounter the person registered, in addition to the notice required by
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) (West 1995).
7
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registrants are subject to law enforcement notification at a minimum."
Police will notify neighbors of sex offenders deemed to be at high risk for
reoffense 6 Notification will be given to school officials and religious and
community group leaders of those offenders deemed to be at a moderate risk
of reoffense.57 For those that are low risk offenders, only law enforcement
officials will receive notification."
The New Jersey Law also provides guidelines to determine the risk of re-
offense. 9 Such factors include whether the offender is released on proba-
tion or parole, whether he is receiving counseling, treatment, or therapy, the
physical condition of the offender, such as advanced age or illness, and
whether the offender served the maximum term." Other considerations are
whether a weapon was used in the offense, the relationship between the
victim and the offender, whether the offender's behavior is characterized as
55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(b).
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(3). Of approximately 1,107 sex offenders who were
ranked by prosecutors, 56 offenders were found to be high-risk, subject to neighborhood
notification. Ruess, supra note 5, at Al.
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(2). 527 out of approximately 1,107 ranked sex offenders
in New Jersey were considered moderate-risk offenders and subject to notification to schools near
their residences and other agencies dealing with women or children. Ruess, supra note 5, at Al.
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(1). 524 sex offenders, ranked out of approximately 1,107
in New Jersey, were deemed to pose a low risk to the community and are not subject to
community notification. Ruess, supra note 5, at Al. For an example of how one court has
applied the Attorney General's guidelines to a convicted sex offender found to be a moderate-
risk, see In re G.B., 669 A.2d 303 (N.J. Super. 1995).
59. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:7-8(b). The registration law provides a nonexclusive list of
factors to be considered in assessing the risk of reoffense:
(1) Conditions of release that minimize risk of reoffense, including but not limited
to whether the offender is under supervision of probation or parole; receiving
counseling, therapy or treatment; or residing in a home situation that provides
guidance and supervision;
(2) Physical conditions that minimize risk or reoffense, including but not limited to
advanced age or debilitating illness;
(3) Criminal history factors indicative of high risk of re-offense, including:
(a) Whether the offender's conduct was found to be characterized by
repetitive and compulsive behavior;
(b) Whether the offender served the maximum term;
(c) Whether the offender committed the sex offense against a child;
(4) Other criminal history factors to be considered in determining risk, including:
(a) The relationship between the offender and the victim;
(b) Whether the offense involved the use of a weapon, violence, or
infliction of serious bodily injury;
(c) The number, date and nature of prior offenses;
(5) Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of recidivism;
(6) The offender's response to treatment;
(7) Recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under supervision
in the community as well as behavior in the community following service of sentence;
and
(8) Recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to commit additional
crimes.
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repetitive or compulsive, the number of sexual offenses the offender has been
convicted of, and the offender's recent behavior or intent to commit
additional crimes.6"
3. Judicial Review Proceedings
Though the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the law's constitutionality,
the Poritz court noted the notification statute impinges on former sex
offenders' liberty interests.62 As such, the law entitles the offenders
protection of procedures designed to assure the risk of reoffense and extent
of notification is evaluated fairly before notification is implemented. 63 The
court concluded that judicial review through a summary proceeding should
be available prior to notification if requested by any person determined to be
a moderate or high risk offender.64
The court ordered the Attorney General to formulate procedures which
would ensure an offender is given timely notice to challenge the notifica-
tion." If the offender files an objection with the court, a date will be set
for a summary hearing and decision on the issue.66  A judge will be
61. Id.
62. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,419-420 (N.J. 1995) (after conviction, "classification as a
'repetitive' and 'compulsive' sex offender inflicts a greater stigma than that resulting from the
conviction for a sex offense when there is no such classification." (quoting State v. Howard, 539
A.2d 1203 (N.J. 1988)).
Under Tier One, only the prosecutor and local law enforcement would receive
notification and [the offender] would be free, to the degree possible, to rehabilitate
his name and standing in the community. However, if classified in Tier Two or
Three, [the offender's] name and standing in the community would be threatened to
the extent that his prior undisclosed criminal history and his new classification become
known. We conclude that the consequences to [the offender's] reputation from
classification in Tier Two or Three implicate a liberty interest.
Id. at 419.
63. Id. at 381. The court based it's finding on New Jersey's doctrine of fundamental
fairness, noting: "Fundamental fairness serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and
arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to
operate arbitrarily." Id. at 420.
64. Id. at 381. Only those offenders who are categorized as tier two (moderate-risk) or tier
three (high-risk) will be privileged with the opportunity for a judicial hearing prior to
notification. This is because only moderate or high-risk offenders are subject to community
notification.
65. Id. The written notice shall inform the offender of the proposed level and specific details
of notification. Id. It shall further inform him that unless the offender applies to the court on or
before the date mentioned in the notice, the notification will go into effect. Id. If the offender
makes such application prior to that time, no notification will be made until and unless affirmed
by the court. Id. If the proposed level of notification is reversed, then the prosecutor provides
notification in accord with the reasons for reversal. Id.
66. Id. at 382.
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appointed and a hearing conducted. A three-judge panel will review the
conclusions of the deciding judge to ensure fairness in treatment.6
Furthermore, a bench manual will be maintained by the court to guide the
reviewing judges throughout the state of New Jersey in their determina-
tions.68 The court noted the legislature may designate or create an agency
to oversee the different levels of classifications rather than place the burden
on state courts.69 The court suggested it might be preferable to have an
agency make the determinations to promote uniformity in notification
matters. 0
Additionally, the court held the judicial proceedings would be civil, not
criminal .7  As such, counsel will not be provided for those sex offenders
through the Public Defender's Office. This is because the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that assistance of counsel shall be
afforded only in criminal prosecutions.72
The court proposed to remedy this problem by ordering designated judges
to assign counsel to indigent claimants on a pro bono basis.73 Chief Justice
Wilentz74 directed the fifteen selected judges in New Jersey to choose the
67. Id. The purpose of the three-judge panel is to oversee the fair treatment of the
appointed judge's decision.
68. Id. at 386.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court stated:
We do not suggest that entities other than the courts could not constitutionally afford
the process required to meet the constitutional obligation. For instance, the
Legislature could designate or create an appropriate agency to oversee tier classifica-
tions and manner of notification, so long as the basic elements of due process, such
as notice, an opportunity to be heard and to confront witnesses, are provided. Such
an agency may better promote uniformity in these matters than would the courts. We
do not suggest that one is better than the other but simply want to note that our
decision does not prevent further legislative action in this area.
Id.
71. See Martin L. Haines, Making Myth Into Law, N.J.L.J., Dec. 18, 1995, at 23.
72. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
73. Haines, supra note 71, at 23.
74. Chief Justice Wilentz wrote the majority opinion in Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N. J.
1995).
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"best and brightest" attorneys in the state to represent the sex offenders. 75
John Furlong, Doe's attorney in the Poritz case, fears the pro bono program
may lead sex offenders who lose their plea to turn around and sue their
attorneys for misrepresentation.76 Others argue that Megan's Law is a
creature of the legislature, and as such, should be backed by proper state
funding. They claim the attorneys of New Jersey should not be funding,
through pro bono assignments, legislative mandates.77
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
A. Ex Post Facto Clause
The Constitution explicitly orders that no state shall pass any ex post
facto law.7 ' The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits a state from enacting any
law which imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable when
committed or increases the amount of punishment annexed to a crime when
it was committed.79
The drafters of the Constitution placed great emphasis on the principle
that, in the new Union recently released from tyranny of British rule, citizens
should not be faced with the prospect that their conduct-innocent when
carried out-could be rendered criminal after the fact." Therefore, the Ex
Post Facto Clause was included in the Constitution.
The Ex Post Facto Clause has been interpreted by the courts as a
prohibition against state governments passing laws which have the effect of
punishing citizens for conduct that would not have been punishable when
committed.8" Such a provision assures that citizens can rely on the present
meaning of legislative acts and will be given fair and explicit notice of any
change in the law. 2
75. Tim O'Brien, Welcome To Megan's List; Wilentz Conscripts 'Best and Brightest' of
Private Bar for Onslaught of Tier Challenges, N.J.L.J., Oct. 2, 1995, at 1. The Chief Judge
probably desires the 'best and the brightest' attorneys to represent appealing sex offenders so as
to avoid a possible Sixth Amendment challenge regarding inadequate counsel. See id.
76. Id. Furlong notes that the burden shifts to the sex offender to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence that the classification is not a fair assessment of his likelihood to reoffend. He
claims: "Prosecutors are immune from liability, but not private lawyers, and you can be [sure]
that some offenders who lose will turn around and sue their lawyer." Id. (quoting Furlong).
77. Id.
78. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
79. Id. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981) (holding that relief under the Ex
Post Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but lack of fair notice and
governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed
when the crime was committed).
80. Artway v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 671 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3. Dall.) 386, 389 (1798)). The Constitution prohibits both Congress and
states from enacting ex post facto laws. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §§ 9, 10.
81. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 671.
82. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
19961
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The United States Supreme Court has struggled with developing an
accurate test to determine whether a law is ex post facto. In Calder v.
Bull, 3 the Court began by establishing the framework for ex post facto
analysis. This framework, known as the Calder categories, provides a law
will violate the ex post facto prohibition if it changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed. 4 Later on, in Kring v. Missouri,'s and Thompson v. Utah,86
the Court broadened the Calder categories to include any law which, in
relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to
his disadvantage or deprives a defendant of a substantial right involved in his
liberty. However, in Collins v. Youngblood, 7 the Court reversed and held
that cases such as Kring and Thompson departed from the original meaning
of the Ex Post Facto Clause and thus, overruled both cases, re-establishing the
Calder categories as the controlling definition of the ex post facto law.8
Even prior to Collins v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court expressed
reliance on the Calder categories when deciding Weaver v. Graham.9 In
Weaver, the Court held that repealing a Florida statute which reduced
amounts of "good-time" for good conduct deducted from a prisoner's
sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to a prisoner whose
crime was committed before the new statute's enactment. 90 The test the
Weaver Court used for measuring legislation against the ex post facto
provision in the Constitution ensured that legislative acts give fair warning of
their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly
83. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
84. In Calder, the Court interpreted the ex post facto provision to prohibit: (1) Every law
that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; (2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed; (3) Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than
the law annexed to the crime, when committed; (4) Every law that alters the legal rules of evi-
dence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. Id. at 389.
85. 107 U.S. 221 (1882), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
86. 170 U.S. 343 (1898), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
87. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
88, Id (holding that disadvantage and deprivation of a substantial right is not the proper test
to be applied, but rather, the appropriate test is whether the statute is punishment. Citing
Calder, the Youngblood Court held a law will violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if it (1) punishes
as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; (2) makes more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or (3) deprives one charged with
a crime of any defense available according to the law at the time the act was committed. Id.
89. 450 U.S. 24 (1980).
90. Id. Mr. Weaver was sentenced to 15 years in prison for second-degree murder. Id. at
25. At the time of his sentencing, the Florida statute provided a formula for deducting gain-time
[good-time] credits from sentences. Id. at 26 (citing FLA. STAT. § 944.27(1) (1975)). According
to the formula, the authorities granted five, ten, and fifteen days per month off the prisoner's
respective years in prison. Id. In 1978, the Florida Legislature repealed the statute and enacted
a new formula for monthly gain time deductions saying authorities shall grant three, six, and nine
days for the same corresponding in-prison years. Id.
[Vol. 32
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changed. Such a holding restricts governmental power by restraining
arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.9
The Weaver Court found that two critical elements must be present for
a law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to
events occurring before it was enacted, and it must disadvantage the offender
affected by it.92 The Court held a law does not have to impair a vested right
to violate the ex post facto prohibition.93 It is not an individual's right to
diminished punishment that is deemed critical to granting relief under the Ex
Post Facto Clause, but rather, lack of fair notice and governmental restraint
when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when
the crime was consummated. 94 Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal
provisions accorded by the legislature, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if
the statute is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on
the date of the offense.95
B. Meaning of Punishment
In deciding whether the registration and notification laws were more
burdensome than the law in effect on the date of Doe's crime, the Poritz
court engaged in an ex post facto analysis of the statutes, focusing on the
purpose of the legislation. The court found if the statute imposed a disability
for the purpose of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter
others, etc., it would be considered penal. However, if it imposed a disability
not to punish but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose,
then it would not be considered penal for purposes of constitutional
analysis.96 The court concluded that the controlling characterization of the
statutes would depend on the evident purpose of the legislature.97
1. Legislative Intent
In assessing the legislature's intent in creating the sex offender registra-
tion and notification laws, the court found the statutes were remedial in
91. Id at 28.
92. Id. at 27 (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937), and Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3. Dall.) 386, 390 (1795)). In Poritz, the sex offender registration and notification laws
apply to John Doe because of acts that he committed years before the statute's enactment.
Therefore, the legislation as applied to him is retroactive.
93. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
94. Id. at 30.
95. Id. at 30-31.
96. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 395 (N.J. 1995).
97. Id. at 392 (noting: "Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions,
the punitive/regulatory distinction [vill] turnol on 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the
restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
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nature-crafted to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose.9 The
court noted that the laws were designed solely to enable the public to protect
itself from danger posed by sex offenders who are widely regarded as having
the highest risk of recidivism.99
Despite Doe's contention that the law imposes a retributive and deterrent
effect upon all convicted sex offenders, the court found that the law did not
constitute punishment because it was not designed for deterrent or retributive
purposes.' The court noted the deterrent and retributive effects are not the
design of the statute, but rather, the inevitable consequence of the remedial
provisions.'
98. Id. at 422-23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 provides:
The Legislature finds and declares: a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex
offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against children, and the
dangers posed by persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness, require a
system of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert
the public when necessary for the public safety. b. A system of registration of sex
offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against children will provide
law enforcement with additional information critical to preventing and promptly
resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (Vest 1995).
99. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 375. The court stated:
As a group, sex offenders are significantly more likely than other repeat offenders to
reoffend with sex crimes or other violent crimes, and that tendency persists over time.
A 15-year follow-up study by the California Department of Justice of 1,362 sex
offenders arrested in 1973 found that 19.7% were rearrested for a subsequent sexual
offense. Those first arrested for rape by force or threat had the highest recidivism
rate, 63.8% for any offense, and 25.2% for a subsequent sex offense. Sex offenders
were five times as likely as other violent offenders, and more than six times as likely
as all types of offenders, to reoffend with a sex offense. Similarly, a Washington
State study of 1,373 adult male sex offenders convicted between 1985 and 1991 and
released by the end of 1991 showed that after seven years of follow-up, 12% were
rearrested for sex offenses and an additional 3% were rearrested for violent offenses.
Of the 110 offenders reconvicted of a sex offense, 43% were reconvicted of a more
serious sex offense ....
Id.
100. Id. at 391 (noting that laws are deemed punitive if the penal effect is caused by a part
of the law which does not serve a regulatory purpose). "We find it difficult to accept the notion
that the Registration and Notification Laws are designed or are likely to deter repetitive and
compulsive offenders who were not previously deterred by the threat of long-term incarceration."
Id. at 404.
101. Id.
Even assuming that removing the shield of anonymity constitutes deterrence, and
therefore is arguably punitive, that is the inevitable consequence of these remedial
measures .... It is not intended as punishment but rather is a consequence that is
simply unavoidable, for it goes to the very heart of the remedy: that which is
allegedly punitive, the knowledge of the offender's record and identity, is precisely
that which is needed for the protection of the public.
14
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Furthermore, the court explained the remedial nature of the law by noting
the statute only applies to persons found to be repetitive and compulsive sex
offenders, i.e., those most likely to reoffend.' 2 In addition, the law applies
to those persons without culpability such as those found not guilty by reason
of insanity-all classes of persons whom the court found would be excluded
if punishment were the goal." 3
Moreover, the court held if the statute is to effectuate its remedial
purpose, the law must apply to all sex offenders, including those convicted
prior to the statute's enactment.104  If the statute did not apply to those
offenders, the law's effectiveness would be severely limited." 5 If the
Legislature chose to exempt previously-convicted offenders, the court
reasoned that the notification provision would not have provided protection
on the day it became law because it would not have applied to anyone." 6
The court held there would be no justification for protecting children of the
future from the risk of reoffense by future offenders, but not today's children
from the risk of reoffense by previously-convicted offenders. 107
2. Legislative Effect
In Poritz, Justice Stein disagreed with the majority's analysis and
conclusion, implying the majority relied too much on legislative history and
too little on reality. In a very persuasive dissenting opinion, Justice Stein
rejected the court's use of exclusive reliance on legislative intent, noting that
determination of punishment should depend on the purposes actually served
by the sanction, not the underlying nature of the proceeding which gave rise
to the sanction.' He concluded the laws were punishment in effect.
In his dissent, Justice Stein stated that the court should have used factors
taken from the case of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez"0 9 to determine
whether the New Jersey registration and notification laws are punitive or
102. Id.




107. Id. The court noted the number of already-convicted sex offenders vastly exceeds the
number of those who, after passage of the notification law, will be convicted and released.
108. Id. at 431 (Stein, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447
n.7 (1989)).
109. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). In Mendoza-Martinez, the issue concerned the
constitutionality of provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, that mandated loss of citizenship for the offense of leaving or remaining outside the
country to evade military service. The statutes were challenged as imposing punishment without
due process, in that the prospective deportees were not accorded rights guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, including notice, compulsory process, confrontation, trial by jury, and
assistance of counsel. In determining that the sanction of deportation constituted punishment, the
Court referred to tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or
regulatory. The determining factors came to be known as the seven-factor Mendoza-Martinez
test. Id. at 168-69.
1996]
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regulatory."' These factors include whether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as
punishment, and whether it comes into play on a finding of scienter."I
Other factors include whether the law's operation will promote traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose may be
assignable for the law, and whether the law appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose for which is it assigned."'
For example, in In re Reed,' the California Supreme Court applied the
Mendoza-Martinez test and held that sex offender registration was punish-
ment. The petitioner was convicted of soliciting "lewd or dissolute conduct"
and was ordered to register as a sex offender." 4 Applying the Mendoza-
Martinez factors, rather than looking at legislative intent, the court held that
mandatory registration of sex offenders who were convicted under a
misdemeanor disorderly conduct statute was an affirmative restraint in effect
and therefore constituted punishment. "'
110. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 433 (Stein, J., dissenting). The Poritz majority rejected the
Mendoza-Martinez factors in determining whether the statute imposes punishment. The court
argued that the Mendoza-Martinez factors are more properly applied when the question is whether
a proceeding should be characterized as civil or criminal, not whether the sanction involved is
remedial or punitive. Id. at 403.
111. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
112. Id. at 168-69. In State v. Noble, a case involving retroactive application of Arizona's
sex offender registration statute, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that the Mendoza-Martinez
factors focus appropriate attention on the effects of the registration requirement of convicted sex
offenders and on the rationality between the requirement and its purported non-punitive function.
These factors were used to determine whether the Arizona registration statute was punitive. The
court found, though registration had historically been regarded as punishment, because the
Arizona statute limits access to the information, the stigma resulting from registration is limited.
The court held that if the statute extended to community notification [such as New Jersey's law,
there would be a stigmatic effect. The potential stigma would have convinced the Noble court
that the statute operates primarily as punishment, and thus may not be applied retrospectively.
State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1222-23 (Ariz. 1992).
113. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983). California law requires convicted sex offenders to register
with the local police chief or county sheriff and to furnish a current address, fingerprints, and
photograph, as well as any information deemed necessary by California's Department of Justice.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290-290.7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996). The statute imposes the same
requirements on persons convicted of sexual crimes in other states who subsequently relocate to
California. See § 290(a)(2). Following initial registration at the time of release, parole,
probation, or relocation to the state, sex offenders must inform law enforcement officials of any
changes of address in writing within ten days. See § 290(f). Failure to do so results in
mandatory jail sentences that increase in length depending on the severity of the underlying
offense and the number of prior violations. See § 290(g). California also has a "900" telephone
number which members of the public can call to find out whether an individual is a registered
offender. See § 290.4(a)(3). The operator will provide the offender's physical description, town
of residence, and zip code. See § 290.4 (a)(2)-(3). To obtain such information, the caller must
provide the first and last names and middle initial of the suspected offender. Id.
114. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
115. Id. at 217. The analysis in this case was on whether the registration statute violated the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, rather than ex post facto
prohibitions. However, because the analysis both centers on whether the statute is punishment,
the decision is relevant in an ex post facto context as well.
16
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A similar argument can be made about public notification under Megan's
Law. By notifying the public of a sex offender's presence in the community,
the state imposes an affirmative disability on the offender because the
offender will be forced to experience a lifetime stigma that will attach from
the notification.11 6
a. Historical Punishment
Justice Stein wrote in Poritz that a comprehensive and balanced inquiry
should be made into whether the notification law imposes punishment. Such
consideration should include whether its impact, the widespread publicizing
of information concerning sex offenders within their community, is consistent
with practices historically employed as punishment in the past.117
One such practice historically utilized for punishing criminals was public
humiliation and degradation. 8 Such method of punishment, developed
during the seventeenth century, was branding, in which a single letter
representing the first letter of the crime committed was burned onto the
wrongdoer's face." 9 Murderers were branded with the letter "M," thieves
with a "T," fighters and brawlers with an "F," and vagrants with a "V.' 120
Historians note the branding had the effect of a spell.' It took the
criminal out of ordinary relations with humanity, and enclosed him in a
sphere by himself. 121
The purpose of branding in the seventeenth century was to make certain
persons or groups of persons easily identifiable and thus, easily ostracized or
116. If everyone in the community knows the horrible crime(s) that the offender is supposed
to have committed, people will view him in light of those offenses and treat him like an outcast.
Psychologists believe that offenders who are released into a community that treats them like an
animal, rather than a human being, sooner or later believe themselves that they are animals and
so behave accordingly. See Joan Abrams, Sex Offenders: After Prison Confined to Their New
Life, LEWISTON MORN. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1993, at IA. Offenders believe that public notification
may lead to increases in recidivism rates. One offender subjected to public notification stated:
"'A lot of offenders still in prison would crack under the pressure I've been under,' and some
will be driven to commit crimes again." Id.
117. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 437 (1995) (Stein, J., dissenting).
118. Jon Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern
Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1360.
119. Id. at 1361 (citing HARRY E. BARNEs, THE STORY OF PuNisHmENT: A RECORD OF
MAN's INHUMANITY TO MAN 43 (Patterson Smith, rev. ed. 1972)).
120. Brilliant, supra note 118, at 1361.
121. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 53-54 (Ohio State U. Press, 1962).
122. Id.
But the point which drew all eyes, and, as it were, transfigured the wearer, so that
both men and women, who had been familiarly acquainted with Hester Prynne, were
now impressed as if they beheld her for the first time, was that SCARLET LETTER,
so fantastically embroidered and illuminated upon her bosom. It has the effect of a
spell, taking her out of the ordinary relations with humanity, and inclosing [sic] her
in a sphere by herself.
19961
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set apart. An example of branding [without fire] was the requirement in Nazi
Germany that Jewish persons wear the Star of David on a sleeve so they
might be easily identified."I
As society's view of these measures changed over time, however,
American courts began to declare various forms of branding to be cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution.1 24 Most
recently, in February of 1995, a federal district judge likened the New Jersey
sex offender notification law to the kind of branding utilized in colonial
times, and found the notification law unconstitutional because it imposes
punishment upon the released sex offender.25
b. United States District Court v. New Jersey Supreme Court
1. Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey
In Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, the federal court examined
Megan's Law and came to a conclusion contrary to Poritz.'26 The Artway
court held that the notification provision is punishment and cannot be applied
retroactively or it would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitu-
tion. 127
Artway involved a forty-nine year old resident of New Jersey who had
served time in prison for a sodomy conviction.1 28  Upon his release from
123. Artway v. Attorney Gen. N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 687 (D.N.J. 1995).
124. Brilliant, supra note 118, at 1362. In Illinois, a judge forced drunk drivers to place
an apology and a photograph in local newspapers. The judge justified the sentence by noting the
"open and public admission... make[s] it more likely that the [offender] will not commit further
crimes." Such sentencing subjects the offender to punishment by public humiliation. Id. at 1363
(citing Joseph R. Tybor, Unusually Creative Judges Now Believe Some Punishments Can Fit the
Times, CHIC. TRIB., July 3, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 1). In a Florida case, the court required a
convicted drunk driver to place a bumper sticker in his car that read: "CONVICTED
D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE." The court continually referred to this requirement as
punishment. Id. at 1369 (citing Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Ct. App.
1986)). The most extreme case was in Oregon, where the court subjected a released child
molester to a punitive requirement that he place a sign on both sides of his car and on the door
of his home stating in three-inch lettering: "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER-NO CHILDREN
ALLOWED." Id. at 1365-66 (citing State v. Bateman, 95 Or. App. 456, 771 P.2d 314 (1989)).
See also Rosalind K. Kelley, Sentenced To Wear The Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations In
Sentencing-Are They Constitutional?, 93 DicK. L. REv. 759 (1989); Jeffrey C. Filcik, Signs Of
The Times; Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291
(1990); Leonore H. Tavill, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty Is Today's
Probation Condition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 613 (1988).
125. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 687.
126. Artway held that New Jersey's notification statute applied in retrospect to sex offenders
is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of both the federal and state constitutions. Poritz, on
the other hand, upheld the statute's constitutionality, holding that the statute does not impose
punishment, and therefore, is not ex post facto.
127. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 691.
128. Judge Strikes Down Portion of New Jersey Sex Offender Law, OREGONIAN, Mar. 1,
1995, at A12. Alexander Artway was convicted in 1965 of statutory rape and in 1969 of
sodomizing a 21-year-old woman.
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prison, Artway was required to register in the state of New Jersey as a
convicted sex offender pursuant to Megan's Law.'29 Artway claimed in his
pleadings that Megan's Law deprived him of his right to due process, equal
protection and privacy, that the law violates the constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, ex post facto laws and protection from
bills of attainder.'30
The Federal District Court upheld the registration requirement but struck
down the provisions allowing community notification for sex offenders
sentenced prior to passage of the law.'31 The Artway court barred the state
from releasing to the public any information on sex offenders whose crimes
were committed before Megan's Law took effect on October 31, 1994. '32
The court wrote that a privacy interest is implicated when the government
assembles diverse pieces of information into a single package and dissemi-
nates that package to the public.'33  Such notification ensures that a person
cannot assume anonymity-it prevents a person's criminal history from fading
into obscurity and being completely forgotten.'34
The Artway court held the notification law constituted additional
punishment upon convicted sex offenders because such notification is likely
to result in the ostracizing of the offender, incite violence against him, reduce
his job opportunities, and make it more difficult for him to lead a normal
life.' 35
2. E.B. v. Poritz
Similarly, on February 1, 1996, in E.B. v. Poritz, United States District
Court Judge Politan 36 barred New Jersey authorities from effecting their
plans to notify residents in Englewood, New Jersey about a released sex
offender and murderer, known under the alias of "E.B.' 37
129. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 668. Artway had been classified by psychiatrists as being a
repetitive and compulsive sex offender.
130. Id. at 669.
131. Id. at 692.
132. Id
133. Id. at 688.
134. Id.
135. Id. Artway is now pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
136. Judge Politan served as the presiding judge in Artway v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey
where he held the notification law to be unconstitutional when applied in retrospect. See
discussion supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
137. E.B. v. Poritz, 914 F. Supp. 85 (D.N.J. 1996). In 1974, E.B. pled guilty to three
separate offenses of sexual abuse against young boys and was subsequently sentenced to thirty-
three years in the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC). Id. Thereafter, in 1976, E.B.
pled guilty to two separate counts of murder and was subsequently sentenced to two concurrent
terms of twenty years' incarceration. This sentence was to run consecutive to the sentence for
his sexual assaults. Id.
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On June 15, 1989, E.B. was released from prison, subject to supervised
parole until July 23, 2006.138 In accordance with Megan's Law, E.B.
registered with the Englewood Police Department on February 25, 1995.11
Eight months after his registering, on October 24, 1995, E.B. learned that he
had been classified as a high risk offender. 40 As a result, the Bergen
County Prosecutor's Office sought to notify the community of E.B.'s criminal
history.
141
After attempting, unsuccessfully, to halt the proposed notification in New
Jersey state courts,' E.B. brought suit in Federal District Court requesting
a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent such notification until an expected
appellate decision is made on the constitutionality of Megan's Law.' The
United States District Court granted the injunction, noting that the notification
law improperly imposes punishment on someone who has already paid his
debt to society, thus, stigmatizing him and subjecting him to possible
vigilante attacks.'44
138. Id. On June 5, 1979, E.B. was paroled from the sexual offense sentence after serving
only five years and ten months of a thirty-three year sentence. Id. E.B. then served his
concurrent twenty-year sentences for murder. Id. He was paroled slightly ten years later. Id.
E.B. currently receives aftercare treatment at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, attends
Church regularly, is married and owns a home in Englewood, New Jersey. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. See discussion of tier classifications supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
141. The Prosecutor proposed to notify the following: all public and private educational
institutions and organizations within a one-half mile radius of E.B.'s home, as well as people
who reside or work within a one-block radius of E.B.'s home. E.B., 914 F. Supp. at 85.
142. E.B. applied for judicial review of the tier three classification and of the proposed
notification. Id. On December 7, 1995, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, held a
hearing and on December 18, 1995, affirmed the Prosecutor's tier classification and permitted
notification to all public and private educational institutions and licensed day care centers and
summer camps in Englewood, Teaneck, Bergenfield, Tenafly, Englewood Cliffs, Leonia and Fort
Lee, New Jersey. Id. Further, the court ordered notification to all residences within a one-block
radius of E.B.'s home. Id. E.B. also filed and was granted a Notice of Appeal and Emergent
Application for a Stay of Notification issued from the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division on December 20, 1995 . Id. Subsequently, the court affirmed the Law Division on
December 22, 1995, but granted effect to the Stay until December 26, 1995. Id. On January 18,
1996, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied E.B.'s petition for certification of appeal. Id. E.B.
then brought suit in Federal District Court on January 19, 1996, challenging the proposed
notification. Id.
143. Id. A decision is pending in the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995) (appeal pending, Nos. 95-5157,
95-5194, 95-5195 (3d Cir.)).
144. James Aheam, Would-Be Senators Play To The Galleries On E.B. Toricelli and Zimmer
Should Know Better, R. N. N.J., Feb. 7, 1996, at N7. E.B. presented the court with a threatening
letter which he received at his residence on January 31, 1996. The letter was submitted as proof
that E.B. would suffer irreparable harm if community notification was permitted. The letter
states as follows:
It is disgusting that they would allow a filthy repulsive piece of garbage like you out
of prison. They should have sent you to the gas chamber. You deserved to die.
Anyone who assaults children does not have the right to live. 
We do not want the
likes of you in our neighborhood[sic]. You should go back to prison where you can
be around bums, criminals and sub-humans like you. People like you never change.
You will always be a criminal. Go away, we do not want you here. We do not want
[Vol. 32
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/5
DOE v. PORImz, A CONSTITUTIONAL YIELD
IV. WAS POPTZ CORRECTLY DECIDED?
A. Vigilantism
The problems enumerated by the Artway and E.B. courts have been
documented in several incidents where released offenders have found it very
difficult to lead normal lives once the public received notification of their
reintegration into society. Offenders who have been targeted after notification
have been driven from communities or otherwise harassed.
In July of 1993, the home of a convicted child rapist was burned to the
ground after his neighbors were warned of his release from prison. 4
Furthermore, a survey conducted by Washington State Institute for Public
Policy at Evergreen State College revealed that over a three-year period,
fourteen notification-related incidents took place in Washington. 46 The
incidents ranged from situations where offenders and sometimes their
families, received taunts, to a case in which one offender was punched in the
nose when he opened his door.147
More recently, in early 1995, a father and his son broke into a Phillips-
burg, New Jersey home looking for a released child molester who had been
identified by county police. 48  Law-enforcement authorities had provided
community residents with the address where the offender was to reside and
distributed photographs of him.' 49  The father and son assaulted the wrong
individual. Their victim was a forty-one-year-old truck driver who had been
staying at the home of the released sex offender.5  The beating was so
severe the victim had to be hospitalized.'
to live in fear that you will assault and kill [our] innocent children. You should kill
yourself, you will never have a normal life, you have no good reason for living. You
know that you are not normal and you know you need to die. Kill yourself and end
the misery you have caused so many people. Make all the suffering go away, kill
yourself and the sooner the better.
E.B., 914 F. Supp. at 91.
145. Lisa Anderson, Demand Grows to ID Molesters, States Weigh Children's Safety Versus
Offender's Rights, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1994, at 1.
146. Id. Since Washington activated community notification, vigilante incidents have
included arson, death threats, slashed tires, and loss of employment. See Jackson, supra note 4.
147. Anderson, supra note 145, at 1.
148. John Ritter, Critics Say Law's Behind Surge In Vigilantism, USA TODAY, Jan. 12,
1995, at A7. Michael Groff, age 25, was released from prison after serving four years of a 10-
year sentence for sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. See 2 N.J. Men
Charged in Beating Sparked By Sex Offender Law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter
2 N.J. Men].
149. Ron Devlin, Megan's Law: A New Scarlet Letter, THE MORNING CALL, Jan. 15, 1995,
at Al.
150. Id.; 2 N.J. Men, supra note 148, at 3.
151. Id. Kenneth J. Kerekes Sr. and his son, Kenneth Jr., have been charged with assault,
conspiracy, harassment, burglary, and criminal mischief. See Ritter, supra note 148, at A7.
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Additionally, some residents of New Jersey protested outside the home
of a convicted sex offender's mother.'52 The residents handed out fliers to
pedestrians with large pictures of the sex offender and the warning
"BEWARE" in block letters.' The fliers also included a phone number
to call to report the offender's location. 5 Some of the residents hinted
they might take the law into their own hands if the offender appeared.
15
Two men stated: "We're waiting for him to come down... [we're] going
to beat him up."' 56 Another resident stated: "Let the criminal have a taste
of being the victim.""'
1. New Jersey Supreme Court's Response to Vigilantism
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in deciding Poritz, did not concede that
such vigilante acts have taken place or would in the future. 5 1 One reason
the court had for upholding the constitutionality of Megan's Law was the
justices' refusal to 'speculate' that the notification requirements would lead
to a punitive response from the community, or that the media would not act
responsibly in dealing with the public disclosures required by the law.'59
The court stated the strongest message would be delivered by the governor
and other public officials as well as by community and religious leaders and
the media, that this is a law that must be used to protect and not to punish,
and all citizens must conform their conduct accordingly. 6 However, based
on the history of past vigilante attacks, it is clear that the public has not
152. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 430 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosemarie
Ross, Rapist, Beware: Residents' Fear Turns to Anger, Revenge, N.J. HERALD & NEWS, Jan.
6, 1995, at Al, A4).
153. Id,
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Ron Day, Rapist Beware: Angels Hand Out His Photo in Passaic, N.J.
HERALD & NEWs, Jan. 6, 1995, at Al, A4).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 431.
158. The court noted, "We do not perceive in this case a society clamoring for blood,
demanding the names of previously convicted sex offenders in order to further punish them, but
rather families concerned about their children who want information only in order to protect
them." Id. at 377.
159. The court noted:
This Court has no right to assume that the public will be punitive when the
Legislature was not, that the public, instead of protecting itself as intended, will
attempt to destroy the lives of those subject to the laws, and this Court has no right
to assume that community leaders, public officials, law enforcement authorities, will
not seek to educate the public concerning the Legislature's intent, including
appropriate responses to notification information ... and this court has no right to
assume the media will not act responsibly.
Id. at 376.
160. Id. The court warned that vigilantism and harassment would not be tolerated and
refused to assume that the public would engage in it. Id
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conformed its conduct as the Poritz court anticipated. In fact, Justice Wilentz
noted at the end of his majority opinion that the court had trepidation about
its ruling.
We sail on truly uncharted waters, for no other state has adopted such a far-
reaching statute. Despite the unavoidable uncertainty of our conclusion, we
remain convinced that the statute is constitutional. To rule otherwise is to
find that society is unable to protect itself from sexual predators by
adopting the simple remedy of informing the public of their presence.
While the remedy may seem simple to the Poritz court, due to the public
harassment and vigilantism that has taken place, the registration and
notification statutes have been facing legal challenges throughout the
country. 62 Registration statutes have routinely been upheld in Alaska,
Arizona, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Washington.163 However, a Califor-
nia court struck down a similar registration statute because it applied to a
161. Id at 422. "What government faced here was a difficult problem, a question of policy,
and it understandably decided that public safety was more important than the potential for unfair,
and even severe, impact on those who had previously committed sex offenses." Id. at 422-23.
However, it is unclear whether notification really makes a difference in preventing sexual
assaults. In New Jersey, for example, even though police informed a community of a released
sex offender, a 15-year-old boy was still lured into the offender's apartment and sexually
assaulted. See Christi Parsons, Notice Laws on Molesters Raise Flags, CHI. TIUB., Nov. 8, 1995,
at 1. See also Deborah Coombe, Megan's Law Fails to Prevent Sex Attack, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), July, 31, 1995, at 1.
162. See Kathy B. Carter, Retroactive Sex Crime Law Raises Thorny Issue, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Jan. 15, 1995, at 1. Only two days after Megan's Law became effective, a
federal district judge ordered a temporary injunction to prevent the enforcement of public
notification. The defendant was a convicted rapist who had been released on January 1, 1995,
the day the law became effective. The defendant was the first sex offender to challenge New
Jersey's registration and notification statute. The District Court judge thought the notification
provisions of the law could have a "punitive impact" upon the released offender and would
subject the offender to "stigma and ostracism." The judge further thought that release of the
information would harm the offender who had paid his debt to society, more than hurt the public
by not identifying him. See Diaz v. Whitman, No. 94-6376 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 1995). See also
Bruce Fein, Bill of Rights Not a Suicide Pact, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1995, at A14.
163. Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1388 (D. Alaska, 1994); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d
1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991); State v. Costello,
643 A.2d 531, 534 (N.H. 1994); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Wash. 1994) (holding that
registration statutes are not punishment because they do not alter prior standards to the
disadvantage of an offender).
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minor category of sex offenders.' 64 Community notification statutes have
also been struck down as unconstitutional in Louisiana.65 and Alaska.'6
6
2. Future Effect of Megan's Law
The likely consequence of the registration and notification law is that sex
offenders subject to its notification provision will simply avoid the require-
ments by moving, for example, to another neighborhood under an assumed
name. One sex offender who is currently receiving treatment at the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenal, New Jersey, said, "I would be
so afraid somebody would find out about me... and if they did find out, I'd
just move out of state. I wouldn't have a choice. I would be forced to run
from one place to the next. My greatest fear is I'd have to start my life
over."
167
Forcing people to move from state to state in fear of their lives is
punishment of a type that was not applicable to sex offenders who were
convicted before Megan's Law was enacted. The United States Supreme
Court has held that an increase in punishment regardless of its extent is ex
post facto and therefore unconstitutional.
61
Applied to John Doe in the Poritz case, the sex offender notification law
should be declared an increase in punishment because Doe will likely be
subject to constant community harassment, endangered with the possibility of
vigilante attacks, and burdened with the probability of losing his current job
and remaining unemployable. This will all be due to branding and stigma
that will attach to Doe once the public is informed that he is a released sex
offender. 69
164. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222 (Cal. 1983). In this case, the petitioner was convicted
of soliciting "lewd or dissolute conduct" from an undercover officer in a public restroom. Id.
at 216. The individual was subsequently required to register as a sex offender. Id. The
California Supreme Court held that mandatory registration of a sex offender convicted under
misdemeanor disorderly conduct violates the California Constitution's cruel and unusual
punishment provision. Id. at 222. The court determined that registration was punishment based
on the factors enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Id.
at 218.
165. See State v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814, 824 (Ct. App. La. 1994) (holding that a sex
offender's condition of probation mandating public notification violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
of both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions because the statute was not in effect before
commission of the crime).
166. See Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska, 1994) (holding that the plaintiff
had a meritorious claim that the public notification provision in the Alaska Registration Act was
punitive and violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution).
167. Mike Kelly, Megan's Dilemmas, REC. N. N.J., July 30, 1995.
168. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937).
169. Justice Stein stated:
The community's reaction to such notice is impossible to predict, but given the
normal range of human emotion one reasonably could anticipate that notice of the
presence of a sex offender will trigger fear, suspicion, hostility, anger, evasive
ehavior, ostracism, and in some cases derision, epithets and violence. To be sure,
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By informing the public of Doe's presence, the community notification
law will jeopardize his chances of reintegrating into society and leading a
productive life. 7 Community notification destroys the anonymity that is
crucial to reintegration. If the community treats Doe, a reformed sex
offender, as a criminal, he will be unable to become a productive member of
society.
Rehabilitation is an important aspect of an offenders life-it enables one
to function as a law-abiding citizen, inapt to commit another sexual
offense."' With the notification law in place, there remains the possibility
that other offenders will not be as willing to plead guilty to crimes out of fear
the offense will brand them for the rest of their lives. Should a judge orjury
find offenders not guilty, the likelihood of those individuals offending again
is great, especially since therapeutic treatment will not have been provided to
them. 7
2
And where will the New Jersey Legislature draw the line between which
criminal releases to publicize? Today the community is told about convicted
sex offenders in the community. Tomorrow, will communities be told of the
release of convicted murderers, arsonists, robbers, etc.? At what point will
those who have been convicted and served their sentence be allowed to live
normal and productive lives? The Supreme Court must draw a bright line
the sex offender's quality of life will be adversely affected. Depending on
circumstances, the sex offender might lose employment, friends, standing in the
community, and might very well be subjected to community hostility so pervasive as
to induce the offender to relocate.
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 439 (D.N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting).
170. Public notification infringes on a former offender's rights. However, many people
believe that a sex offender has given up his rights when he committed a sexual offense. Ann
Cannahan, Police Registry Shows 616 Sex Offenders Living in Area 285 Reside in Denver; List
Stir Controversy, ROCKY MTN. NEWs, Dec. 10, 1995, at A4 (quoting a resident saying: "I
disagree with the notion that they've paid their debt to society. I don't believe the people have
rights anymore. ' ) See also Joan Abrams, Sex Offenders: After Prison Confined To Their New
Life, LEwIsTON MORN. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1993, at IA, (quoting another neighborhood resident: "As
convicted criminals, they should have a diminished expectation of privacy. A lot of their rights
are forfeited by their decision to commit crime ... and if they don't like it, too bad."). Other
people argue that offenders' concerns regarding their anxiety, stigmatization, and unfairness are
outweighed by the unfairness they showed their victims. See Laurie Clark, Gallardo Case-Sexual
Assault Survivors Face Fear, Anxiety Also, SEATrLE TIMEs, July 29, 1993, at 2.
171. Psychologists say that sex offenders need better socialization to prevent reoffense, not
isolation which results from notification laws. See Andrea Bernstein, Will Notification Laws
Help? CHIc. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1996, at 6.
172. The United States Department of Justice estimates the recidivism rate of untreated sex
offenders to be about 60%. See Ann Carnahan, Police Registry Shows 616 Sex Offenders Living
In Area 285 Reside In Denver; Lists Stir Controversy, ROCKY MTN. NEWs, at 4A. Executive
Director of New Jersey Civil Liberties Union has claimed that community notification laws cause
sex offenders to run from their family, avoid treatment, and hide out from the public in order to
maintain anonymity. See Jackson, supra note 4. See also Joe Mahoney, Life For Sex Offenders
After Prison Debate Continues Over Rights Of Parolees And Their Neighbors, THE TIMES
(Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 18, 1994, at Al (quoting a Boston-based forensic psychologist experienced
in working with rapists, "While there may be no 'cure' for sex offenders, they can be given
'good control of their urges' if they participate in therapy programs").
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rule and bar all public notification if the offender was convicted prior to the
enactment of a notification statute.
Granted, society regards sexual crimes as the most horrendous and evil
attacks imaginable, especially when small children, such as Megan Kanka, are
victimized.' In fact, most individuals would want to know if a sex
offender resides in their neighborhood. However, though communities may
desire such notification, this Note's analysis has shown that there is no
constitutional right to that information, especially if the sex offender was
convicted prior to the enactment of the notification law.' 74
CONCLUSION
The Poritz court justified the ex post facto application to released
offenders on the need for societal safety. 75 The court held despite the
possible severity of impact on sex offenders' loss of anonymity, that result is
not a constitutional bar to society's attempt at self-defense. 76 Accordingly,
the court chose to risk unfairness to previously convicted sex offenders over
unfairness to children and women who might suffer due to ignorance of the
offender's presence in the community.'77 Such a holding is based on fear
and emotionalism, rather than on deep-rooted constitutional principles
embedded in our nation's legal system. 7
Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the Constitution
shall be the supreme law of the land whereby all judges must abide."' The
Founders never claimed that courts may balance prospective danger to the
public over an individual's constitutional rights, such as protection from ex
173. See supra p. 1.
174. The focus of this Note has been on the ex post facto violation of the registration and
notification laws. Therefore, the author is not addressing whether the law is unconstitutional per
se.
175. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 422 (N.J. 1995).
176. Id. at 372.
177. Id.
178. At least one commentator, who has admitted her belief that Megan's Law is
unconstitutional, noted: "My desire to keep my children safe is not rooted in fairness, nor in
reason... My desire to protect; in fact, brings out the vigilante in me. I want to protect my own
children even if it infringes on the rights of others." See Elizabeth Simpson, Singling Out Sex
Offenders: When Heart Wins Over Mind, VIRGIMAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.),
Feb. 11, 1996, at BI.
179. U.S. CONST. art. VI, provides:
The Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance of the Constitution;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be
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post facto laws.' The purpose of the Constitution was to lay down the
foundation for a unified government, one that would recognize and respect
the rights of each individual in society. Relying on that purpose and the
textual language of the framers, it is clear that the constitutional rights of one
individual should not yield to the emotional fear of an angry society.
Tested against the historical uses and purposes of punishment, public
notice and public ostracism of sex offenders fall within the parameters of
punishment as practiced when the Constitution was adopted."' The
inescapable identification, scorn, and humiliation that public notice creates on
sex offenders is strikingly reminiscent of punishments commonly imposed in
the colonial period. 2 Accordingly, community notification, regardless of
its aim, has the functional effect of increasing a sex offender's punishment
retroactively in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
Therefore, because John Doe has a constitutional right to be free from
application of ex post facto laws, and because the sex offender notification
statute is ex post facto, the United States Supreme Court should reverse the
New Jersey high court's ruling in the Poritz case and bar retroactive
application of the notification law to sex offenders who were convicted prior
to the law's enactment.
Lori N. Sabin*
180. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. Once an offender has served his sentence, his constitutional
rights are restored to some degree, and may not be unilaterally revoked by an ex post facto law,
absent new wrongdoing on his part.
181. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 439 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
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